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The Nature and Structure of Trade-Financial Networks: Evidence from the 
New Zealand Pastoral Sector 
 
SIMON VILLE and GRANT FLEMING 
Department of Economic History and Department of Commerce 
Australian National University 
Recent work in business organisation provides some insights into how networks develop and 
change over their life cycle. A network based upon trade can evolve into a more widely-
embracing trade and financial network. Larger networks may engender competent leaders who 
intermediate to reduce communication costs and engineer high levels of trust.  This paper 
provides an historically based variation on such hypothesised network structures by showing that 
trade and finance can exist together as part of a network from the outset.  The role and nature of 
leadership will also be shown to change over time.  Its historical focus is the New Zealand 
pastoral industry.  Pastoral agents were intermediaries in a broad trade and financial network 
which brought farmers into contact with a wide range of service providers.  Agent firms 
recognised from early on that regular trading transactions between agent and farmer generated 
trust, reputational effects, and mutual information exchange vital for successful lending and the 
provision of pastoral services. 
 The current paper builds on our earlier work on Australasian networks by providing a 
more in-depth historical analysis focussed on trade-financial networks in New Zealand, 
demonstrating their particular features and how these changed over time.i It discusses the theory 
of networks and focusses on recent work on trade-financial network structures.  The paper then 
applies these ideas to three case studies, the first two of which focus upon the functional 
relationships in networks organised around agents and cooperatives.ii In the third case study we 
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examine networking from a spatial perspective by focussing upon the Otago province of New 
Zealand.  Some conclusions follow. 
 
II 
THE THEORY OF TRADE-FINANCIAL NETWORKS 
 
A network is a cooperative group, a cluster or web of individuals or firms organised into a tight 
or loose federation.  Each party is dependent upon the other for resources and cooperation brings 
about gains for both parties.iii Networks describe relational contracts which may place more or 
less stress on bonds of trust, reciprocity, and obligation.  Network members are drawn together 
by common and complementary interests (such as the same information, labour, capital, 
materials, distribution, marketing) and propinquity, which may include bonds of trade, finance, 
geography, religion, culture, politics, or kinship.  Alvesson and Lindkvist usefully distinguish 
three network types.iv ‘Economic cooperative’ networks focus on economic relations and are a 
means of providing greater economic returns to participants. ‘Social integrative’ networks 
influence group behaviour, integrity, and satisfy a need to belong; thus they operate on a socio-
emotional basis.  ‘Blood kinship’ networks are based upon the strength of family ties and 
represent the polar opposite to economic spot exchange; they involve a relational contract at 
predominantly the social level. 
 Bonds of trust, the establishment of reputation, and the evolution of ‘traditions’ to govern 
behaviour are necessary aspects of network relations.v In an atmosphere of trust, information is 
exchanged freely, providing network partners with a ‘thicker’, more complete, amount of 
information than that obtained in a market, and which is ‘freer’ than that obtained through a 
hierarchy where members may protect themselves from opportunistic behaviour.  Reputation 
commits members to the network relation in that their track record ultimately determines the 
success of on-going economic exchange.  Emphasis on the long term nature of contractual 
relations means that members are less likely to gain from opportunistic behaviour which 
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severely inhibits future exchange.  The sanctions of breaking a tradition are more severe than 
breaking a bureaucratic rule or a market contract as the direct utility cost to the recalcitrant in the 
form of private or public admonishment pervades all aspects of social and economic existence. 
 The network form of organisation provides particular advantages to firms that foster 
intangible assets such as knowledge or human capital.  It permits the sharing of diffused and 
uncodified information and provides an environment conducive to feedback processes important 
in technological change.  In these types of firms networks may allow a reduction in transaction 
costs without incurring higher administrative or bureaucratic costs.  However, it may also be the 
case that strategies adopted in networks are not cost minimising, but are adopted because they 
reduce uncertainty, provide fast access to reliable information and permit firms to respond to 
changing economic circumstances.vi Other major advantages are the economies of scale and 
scope available to small firms.  In addition, networks allow rapid adaptation to market changes 
and accommodate a variety of entrepreneurial visions or product niches.vii 
The above literature helps us to understand what general circumstances give rise to 
networks and an indication of some of their principal benefits. Recent work by Casson provides 
an understanding of how networks develop and change over time, an approach which is valuable 
to historically-based studies of networks.viii Networks may cover a range of different forms of 
economic activity including production, trade, finance, and research. Casson has shown how a 
network based upon trade can evolve into a more widely-embracing trade and financial network 
as technology-driven expansions in scale cause individually financed small production units to 
be supplanted by joint financing of a single large unit; the independent financiers are thus 
brought together.ix A second insight of this work is that as networks grow and become more 
complex intermediation by a well placed and highly competent member of the network can 
reduce communication costs and engineer higher levels of trust.  The leader is presented as 
personal and consultative, because of the wide dispersion of types of expertise and the need for 
coordination. x These insights will be assessed in our study of New Zealand pastoral networks. 
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III 
PASTORAL AGENT FIRMS, 1860-1900: 
RISE OF THE MONOCENTRIC NETWORK 
 
In the first case study we concentrate upon the network dominated by pastoral agent firms in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  The agents were the focal point of the network serving as 
expert intermediaries between farmers and providers of trade and financial services.  We refer to 
this as a monocentric network, diagrammatically akin to a hub with spokes, whereby many 
functional groups were drawn into the network by dint of their close relationship with the agents.  
Networks change over time, indeed organisational flexibility is a key advantage of this form. We 
allude to the changing role of agents in the polycentric network of multiple hubs emerging from 
the end of the nineteenth century, a phase which is investigated in greater detail from the 
perspective of the cooperatives as the alternative focal point of the network, in the second case 
study. 
 Specialist pastoral agents emerged in New Zealand from the mid nineteenth century 
stimulated by the demand from growing numbers of farmers for services such as produce 
consignment, finance, and the sale of property and livestock.  Some developed from local 
mercantile and farming businesses, others received British financial and entrepreneurial support. 
A common characteristic, though, was their embeddedness in local colonial society, closely 
connected with many groups, which helped promote trust, reputation, and traditions vital for 
successful networks.  In recently settled areas with poor external communications and small 
migrant populations social cohesion was common.  Agents built upon these environmental bonds 
and their local connections by engineering additional local flavour as a means of building high 
levels of trust.  They hired employees from the vicinity and decentralised responsibility to 
growing numbers of country branches. The branch was the principal connection between the 
firm’s head office in the urban commercial centre and its rural clients. Branch managers were the 
main client contact point, and the office was centrally located in the main street adjacent to the 
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hotel, community centre, and shops.xi Firms reinforced ties through visits to individual farms and 
by receiving farmers in their home. Branch managers were involved with local social and 
sporting activities, and organised agricultural shows, exhibitions, and competitions.  The branch 
manager’s wife provided moral and social reinforcement to her husband’s local standing.xii 
Social integration and kinship links were reinforced by economic cooperation as agents extended 
their services to draw them into close long term and regular trading with farmers which further 
fostered trust and reputation. 
 These elements formed the basis for a beneficial exchange of information: agents gained 
sufficient knowledge of the farmer to judge whether to continue supporting him while farmers 
gained information and advice about many aspects of farming including the state of markets, 
new products, and general business and accounting techniques. Many farmers were new to the 
occupation and all of them faced relative isolation and novel cultivation and marketing 
conditions. Thus, the network provided farmers with thicker or more complete information than 
the simple market transaction and was freely offered as part of the reciprocation between agent 
and farmer.  
Some agent firms began as auctioneers and wool consignees (stock and station agents) 
and expanded into finance provision which tied farmer clients into long term trading. Others 
were credit providers (pastoral finance companies) who diversified into trading services to 
develop a closer and regular relationship with the farmer.xiii The synergies from providing both 
trade and financial services were clearly recognised by the agents.  They relent at a loss in order 
to secure wool handling commissions, while the organisation of livestock auctions brought them, 
‘closer..in touch with the producer [which is] more advantageous…for a business such as ours’.xiv 
This movement from a solely trade or financial network to a trade-financial one occurred from 
early in the industry’s life cycle and was borne of these synergies rather than economies of scale 
which were few in farming during this period.  The diversification of pastoral services at the 
same time provided agents with broad levels of competency appropriate for network leadership. 
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In the course of diversifying their services the agents drew additional groups into the 
network.  Large national or international firms in banking, wool buying, shipping, insurance, and 
farming supplies viewed the agents as the vital conduit into the local pastoral network through an 
economic cooperative relationship.  With pastoral services spread over long distances and 
engaging actors unknown to each other, the agents intermediation mitigated communication 
costs and acted as reputation guarantors.  Pastoral agents also acted as local commission agents 
for shipping and insurance companies within the broader local trading community and thereby 
emphasised the repeated dealings of the relationship.  Agents played an important informational 
go-between role in the development and testing of new products, passing on feedback from the 
farmer to the agricultural supplier.  A similar informational role was played with wool buyers 
who exchanged knowledge of market and production conditions.  Banks played an important 
role in the network, providing long and short term finance to the agents for onward lending to 
farmers.  Agents were well placed to relend bank money because regular pastoral transacting 
provided them with sectoral expertise and an intimate knowledge of  individual farming 
accounts. This was reinforced by the importance of reputation in long term networked 
relationships which mitigated opportunism by borrower farmers against their agents.  Banks also 
transacted directly with farmers through personal accounts. This provided for cooperative 
behaviour between individual banks and agents, exchanging information about farmers and 
directing personal banking or pastoral business to each other where possible. In some cases 
cooperation extended to the establishment of a pastoral agent subsidiary, for example the Bank 
of New Zealand’s (BNZ) involvement in the foundation of the New Zealand Loan and 
Mercantile Agency Company (NZLMA) in 1865. 
 From the 1880s freezing companies entered the pastoral network.  As specialist and 
localised enterprises, they might develop close relations with the farming communities.  The 
response of the agents was to interpose themselves between the farmer and freezing company 
especially through the provision of credit for farmers and the extraction of a commission from 
the companies. Given their accumulated experience, contacts, and access to bank finance, the 
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agents were well placed to sustain their pivotal role in the face of this threatened competition.  
Agents also resorted to cooperative strategies with the freezing companies which included 
interlocking directorates or equity strategies by acquiring a shareholding in a freezing company.
 Figure 1 illustrates the agent’s role as intermediating network leader.  They intermediated 
trade flows from farmers to shippers, insurers, wool buyers, freezing companies, and agricultural 
suppliers.  In the reverse direction they intermediated finance flows from banks to farmers.  
Information flows were intermediated in either or both directions particularly with banks, 
farmers, wool buyers and agricultural suppliers. 
 
FIGURE 1 
AGENT-LED MONOCENTRIC PASTORAL NETWORK 
 
about here 
 
By the early twentieth century the bonds of the local agent-farmer network had begun to 
weaken. New transport and communications technology, particularly the motor car, telephone, 
and steamship, encouraged firms to expand their geographical coverage to exploit expanding 
national and international markets.  Improved communications also made it easier for firms to 
coordinate their activities over long distances and to locate their decision-making centrally.  
Managers were moved between different locations with which they had no particular social or 
kinship ties.  Moreover, expansion was achieved through incorporation which extended the 
degree of ownership beyond the locality. While the firms continued to play an important role in 
the local economy the social and kinship elements of propinquity had been reduced in favour of 
an economic cooperative relationship.  The networking capabilities of the local agent with 
shipping, insurance, and agricultural supply companies also weakened as expanded levels of 
commercial activity caused many companies in these sectors to set up their own branches or only 
deal with agents who could provide national coverage.  Thus, the agents began to lose their 
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unique leadership role in the network and, as we shall see below, faced serious competition for 
that role from the cooperatives. 
 The prolonged interwar depression drove the farmer and agent further apart.  The 
increasingly complex web of intermediaries now included government agencies, a legacy of 
wartime reorganisation and the subsequent downturn.  Together with mortgagee groups and 
cooperatives, governments mitigated the special nature of the agent-farmer link.  Moreover, a 
series of mergers increased the size and national orientation of the agent firms who also sought 
to diversify beyond pastoral services thus weakening some of their competency based leadership 
of the industry. Agents continued to support many farmer clients through the depression 
although this was more to protect their own exposed asset position with the banks than any sense 
of social network loyalty.  
 Taken together these factors caused the agents to lose their unique leadership role in the 
network.  Social disengagement weakened the bonds of trust and reputation.  Agent 
diversification and loss of network members weakened their competence and mitigated the need 
for a coordinator. 
 
IV 
AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES 1900-1930: 
EMERGENCE OF THE POLYCENTRIC NETWORK 
 
The establishment of agricultural cooperatives by New Zealand farmers in the late nineteenth 
century is characterised by a desire to take advantage of cooperative buying power and to reduce 
transportation and marketing costs associated with placing produce on the local and British 
markets.  Technological developments such as refrigeration and seemingly unlimited British 
demand for produce meant that farmers experienced rising living standards. In addition, an 
increase in State control of domestic transport such as railways and decreases in international 
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shipping rates meant that farmers experienced few of the problems of their American 
counterparts.xv 
We can identify three phases of network development with regard to cooperatives.  First, 
agricultural cooperatives concentrated on short term financing of produce or livestock purchases, 
and on negotiations with suppliers for discounted rates on freight or insurance. Secondly, co-
operatives moved into supplying a wider range of pastoral services and many cooperatives 
operated separate finance or insurance departments to entice farmers to supply pastoral products.  
Often, as was the case with stock and station agents, finance was offered at zero economic profit 
(or even loss) in order to gain access to a flow of income over time.  Thirdly, the State provided 
the legal infrastructure to support cooperatives during the 1920s.  We examine each in turn. 
Farmer cooperatives adopted the appearance of the pastoral agents several decades 
previously in being small and localised.  By contrast, as noted above, many agents had grown to 
an extent that they were more distant from the local communities which they serviced.  
Cooperatives located themselves at the centre of the pastoral network, sometimes acting as an 
intermediary between agents and farmers.  However, their smallness and limited access to 
national and international informational networks meant that many transactions still took place 
directly between stock and station agent and farmer. The rate of change in network structure 
depended on the type of pastoral industry. By 1900 dairy cooperatives had developed from 
localised organisations to become regional concerns.  In 1885 a group of cooperative dairy 
factories formed the Waikato Dairy Factories Association; similar examples can be found in the 
South Island.  Close settlement and the growth of the factory system in the dairy industry 
encouraged a cooperative spirit in the Waikato, Taranaki and Southland.xvi As one 
contemporary noted ‘[c]ontact with fellow-farmers resulting in the recognition and expression of 
common interests is ... encouraged when farmers cart their milk to the factory daily; ... the fact 
that all farmers are similarly affected by the manufacturing policy provides a very definite urge 
to common action’.xvii Cooperative-led networks were less popular amongst sheep and grain 
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farmers, perhaps due to the larger minimum efficient scale required in this production which 
implied a greater geographical dispersion of farms. 
 The transportation, marketing, and selling of produce placed cooperatives at the centre of 
a polycentric trade-financial pastoral network.  Indeed, a functional overlap between stock and 
station agents and cooperatives emerged by the 1910s.  Cooperatives obtained economies of 
scale by merger and acquisition. For example, the New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company 
Limited (NZCDC) was the product of a merger between the Waikato Cooperative Cheese 
Company and the New Zealand Dairy Association in 1919 after severe competition in the 
proceeding decade.  Further expansion via acquisition of the Thames Valley Cooperative Dairy 
Coampany (1920), and companies in Marakopa (1920), Manawaru (early 1920s; date unclear), 
Te Aroha (1920) and Waihou Valley (1922) gave the NZCDC a virtual monopoly over butter 
and cheese making in the Waikato region.  Other mergers to take place in the 1920s included the 
Cooperative Dairy Company of Otago (with Dunedin Butter Company), and the North Island’s 
Opotiki Cooperative Dairy Company (with Nukuhou, Waiotahi and Cheddar Valley). 
Competition between cooperatives and agents intensified during the 1920s as many 
cooperatives expanded their services to include bridging finance, insurance, stock selling, 
shearing services and merchandise.  Indeed, stock and station agents acknowledged that the 
expansion of cooperatives posed a competitive threat. Many cooperatives focused on the 
provision of finance and marketing. The first New Zealand based cooperative to do so was the 
NZCDC, who were soon followed by other factories offering farm finance to entice farmers to 
supply products to their company.xviii Finance became an important mechanism with which to 
contract the farmer to supply the factory with dairy products during the term of the loan, with 
repayments usually deducted from monthly butterfat cheques. 
 The effectiveness of rural cooperatives as pastoral service providers depended crucially 
on the motivation behind their inception, together with their organisational structure, incentive 
schemes, enforcement procedures, and the availability of information.  Their organisational 
structure and the inception motivation were crucial for long term viability.  Cooperatives borne 
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out of regional political militancy did not survive to become important providers of pastoral 
services.  However, cooperatives that were based primarily on economic relationships became 
increasingly competitive with agents.  One advantage of joining a cooperative-led network was 
that it permitted alternative resolution of many of the incentive problems associated with on-
going relational contracts in stock and station led networks.  Farmers contributed equally to the 
financial base of cooperatives and received equal shares in any proceeds (or were equally 
responsible for defaults).  Given conditions of moral hazard an individual’s strategic behaviour 
vis-à-vis other farmers was to lower contributions to the general pool (perhaps to the minimum 
permitted), to request a larger amount of credit and to allocate a higher proportion of any 
borrowings to non-productive activities.  Thus, the incentive structure associated with these 
types of cooperatives fostered free rider problems as farmers could not be induced to supply 
proper amounts of productive inputs when their actions could not be observed and contracted for 
directly.  Resolution of this problem took different guises.  Smaller regional cooperatives relied 
upon kinship and social integrative relationships as a deterrence.  Larger cooperatives were 
based upon economic cooperative ideals and took ‘first call’ on farmers’ produce and income for 
repayment of borrowings (for example, a percentage of the butterfat cheque per month).  Thus, 
even though production took place on an individual basis, the group aspects of the association 
and the empowering of principals led to a decrease in non-cooperative behaviour on the part of 
borrowers (for example, allocating borrowings to non-productive activities or defaulting on the 
loan). 
 The emergence of State marketing boards in New Zealand was partly a legacy of the First 
World War and the experience of the bulk purchasing agreements of the Imperial Government 
Supplies Department, and marks the third phase of the polycentric network. Marketing boards 
were first given legislative support in New Zealand in 1921 when the government enacted the 
Meat Export Control Act 1921-1922. A year later the New Zealand dairy industry received 
similar powers under the Dairy Produce Export Control Act 1923 and other experiments in state 
marketing were tried in the fruit, honey, kauri gum, wheat and flour, poultry, and tobacco 
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industries. The operation of these producer boards was left to the individual industry.  Most 
boards aimed to ensure that New Zealand farmers received the highest returns possible on the 
British market by minimising transportation and marketing costs, undertaking advertising and 
better timing the arrival of produce to coincide with high prices.xix In some areas the boards 
facilitated the trade and financial networks in the pastoral sector; in others the boards took over 
control of functions previously undertaken by stock and station agents and cooperatives (for 
example, by having monopoly control in exporting meat and dairy produce).  Thus, for farmers 
supplying the export market the establishment of a state monopoly (often located in capital 
cities) removed the social-integrative bonds characteristic of earlier networks dominated by 
agents and cooperatives. 
 The establishment of marketing boards was followed by government involvement in 
establishing the institutional structure for the provision of other pastoral services, especially 
bridging finance.  The enactment of the Rural Intermediate Credit Act in 1927 provided 
administrative and financial backing for local cooperative credit associations.xx The cooperative 
credit associations were locally based organisations providing a limited liability structure to 
farmers.  By 1930 there were more than 30 operating in the North Island. Economic 
considerations and community spirit were at the heart of several associations: as a contemporary 
noted ‘many substantial farmers “who were not likely to require loans themselves, have 
nevertheless joined the associations in order to ensure their formation and to see that they receive 
a good start.  By doing so they are playing their part in fostering the co-operative spirit among 
the farming community along the lines provided for”’.xxi The associations provided bridging 
finance previously obtainable from other firms in the pastoral network such as agents or finance 
companies, and testify to the complexity of the trade-financial network by the late 1930s.  Rural 
credit associations established solved the free rider problem by assigning individuals to act as 
principals (four directors elected by the association to oversee local borrowers) although it is 
justifiable to think of the whole group as undertaking the principal role.  As Belshaw noted ‘the 
formation of credit associations and insistence on guarantees in respect of direct loans [provided] 
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a strong incentive to independent and gratuitous supervision.  Members of the credit associations 
[would] endeavour to safeguard their shareholdings’.xxii 
The regional structure of cooperatives reduced the importance and difficulties 
information asymmetries posed in any pastoral economic relationship.xxiii Up to the 1930s the 
cooperative was co-located with stock and station agents as the leader of the pastoral network; 
the relative strength of each leader changing during the early twentieth century.  Figure 2 
illustrates the new polycentric network with two network leaders. 
 
FIGURE 2 
COOPERATIVE- & AGENT-LED POLYCENTRIC PASTORAL NETWORK 
 
about here 
 
As we have noted for agents generally, one of the important features of cooperatives was that 
they tended to operate within relatively confined geographical and social spaces, increasing the 
availability of information to lenders and ensuring low monitoring costs.  The accuracy of 
information not only decreased the likelihood of moral hazard and free rider problems but 
allowed loan contracts to be state contingent as both parties to the loan were able to observe 
community-wide or individual farmer shocks and modify the terms of the contract given 
different contingencies.  Such transactions were consistent with the norms of agricultural 
communities that derived utility from cooperative behaviour and stable community income and 
consumption. 
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V
PASTORAL NETWORKS IN THE PROVINCE OF OTAGO, 1860-1939 
 
The extensive primary evidence relating to pastoral agents in the southerly province of Otago 
permits a more detailed examination of the nature of pastoral networks in this region.  The 
example substantiates the formation of a network around local agents in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the subsequent entry of farmer cooperatives.  Commercial and 
manufacturing activity in Otago was centred around the port city of Dunedin which benefited 
from a large natural harbour.  The Central Otago gold rush from 1863 accelerated economic 
progress and particularly stimulated agricultural output to supply the rapidly expanding 
population.  While gold speculation was believed to have created ‘deep-rooted distrust’ in the 
local trading community, the wool staple attracted, ‘excellent constituents’.xxiv The region, and 
Dunedin in particular, was dominated by Scottish emigrants many of whom were known to each 
other and retained strong links back to their country of origin. 
 
Phase 1:  Local Pastoral Agents 
 
Local agent firms appeared from the 1860s. These included Wright Stephenson (1861), National 
Mortgage Association (NMA) (1864), Murray Roberts (1868), Donald Reid (1878), and 
Stronach Morris (1888).  Dalgety and New Zealand Land & Mortgage Agency were national 
firms which operated in Dunedin but recognised the importance of emphasising and developing 
local ties.  Although most firms entered the pastoral industry specialising in a particular service 
they soon diversified across the mutually supportive main areas of lending, consignment, and 
auctioneering. 
Agent links within the local community were strong.  Donald Reid was a successful 
farmer and politician from North Taieri. His son in law, Thomas Fergus, joined the partnership, 
was a director of several Dunedin companies, and was well known in Central Otago where he 
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had been an engineer, railway contractor, and politician. NMA originated in the business of 
Dunedin entrepreneur George Gray Russell. Wright Stephenson had interlocking directorates 
with other local businesses such as the Dunedin Savings Bank and featured prominent farmers 
and breeders amongst its leading figures. The Stronach and Morris families had experience with 
local farming and land investment enterprises and boasted that ‘the members of our firm have all 
been brought up in Dunedin and are well known to all classes of the community’.xxv They built 
on this endemic cohesiveness through policies designed to engineer trust.  Each firm had offices 
located in Dunedin’s central business district. Reids employed several former farming clients as 
branch managers while their agents on commission included a publican, bailiff, and bank 
manager.xxvi NMA adopted similar policies, including amongst their appointments the son of the 
local mayor at Gore.xxvii Links existed between agency firms.  Donald Stronach had been the 
local manager for NZLMA for ten years before establishing his own firm.  Auctioneers Edward 
Bowler and Jack Macarthur both moved to Reid after long service at Dalgety.xxviii By 1891 the 
agents had established a woolbrokers’ association and were organising joint wool sales with a set 
scale of charges and settlement dates.  Within a few years all of the major firms were members 
and the association’s responsibilities had extended to representing its members in bankruptcy 
hearings and debt collection. Competition, however, remained strong in the areas of service, 
credit, and reputation.xxix 
The origins of competency based leadership of pastoral networks are thus quite clear: 
many agents were experienced entrepreneurs, had good local connections, cooperated on some 
key issues with other firms, and, by providing a widening range of financial and trading services, 
quickly developed sectoral expertise.  The growing size and complexity of the Otago networks 
emphasised the need for a coordinating leader. 
 By a more focussed study at the local level we can identify the firms involved in specific 
pastoral networks.  What emerges is that each agent was at the centre of a particular network of 
‘friendly’ firms providing different functional services to the pastoral sector.  Members of this 
network transacted with each other whereever possible thereby emphasising the elements of trust 
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and reputation.  These links are particularly well documented for the case of NMA (Figure 3) 
which transacted its banking business with National Bank of New Zealand, its shipping with 
Union steamship, its insurance with National Insurance, its agricultural equipment with Reid & 
Gray, and its refrigeration with Longburn Freezing works.  The links which drew together these 
particular firms were notably personal. Interlocking directorates were particularly important.  
NMA’s general manager, G. R. Ritchie, was also chairman of directors of Union Steamship and 
National Insurance and sat on the Boards of several other closely linked local companies.  
NMA’s chief accountant and secretary were also involved in similar interlocking directorates.  
Conversely, James Mills, chairman of Union Steamship, sat on the Board of NMA.  These three 
firms had contiguous head offices in Water Street and, indeed, exchanged premises on several 
occasions.  In smaller centres, office-sharing was not uncommon, National Insurance and NMA 
using the same offices at Timaru.xxx Sharing of travellers with insurers or agricultural suppliers 
was also quite common.xxxi The links with Longburn and Reid & Gray were reinforced with 
periodic equity investments in these firms. Correspondence provides further confirmation of a 
specific network, NMA writing to Union Steamship, ‘you know you can rely upon us always 
working in with you to our mutual advantage’.xxxii Likewise, the NMA looked to the NBNZ to 
influence farmers banking with them to send their pastoral business to NMA in the same way as 
BNZ and BNSW did for their friendly agents.xxxiii 
FIGURE 3 
OTAGO AGENT-LED MONOCENTRIC PASTORAL NETWORK BY THE 1880s 
 
about here 
 
These high levels of interconnection with other members of the network helped the 
agents to coordinate policies and arbitrate any potential areas of disagreement between firms, for 
example in setting freight rates and sailing schedules for wool shipments.  In this way network 
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loyalty could be maintained, NMA stressing the maxim, ‘never to change business relationships 
unless compelled to do so’, aware of all the benefits of long term transacting in terms of trust and 
reputation.xxxiv Nonetheless, the networks sometimes came under pressure.  The pastoral agent’s 
closest connection and first loyalty was to the farmer as the source of most of his income and 
most extensive trading, financial, and informational transactions.  If the agent was not satisfied 
with the shipping terms being offered by the network company it would threaten to look to 
another firm from outside the network even though it risked losing long term benefits and 
agency commissions.  For example, NMA fostered competition in the shipment of frozen meat in 
the 1880s between SSA and White Star to try and prevent either company gaining a monopoly of 
this valuable new trade.xxxv 
Phase 2: National Agents and a Local Cooperative 
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the locus of economic activity in New Zealand was 
shifting northwards to Wellington and Auckland which were more centrally located and could 
more easily handle large ocean-going steamships travelling both east and west.  Moreover, the 
Wairarapa region close to Wellington was developing into an important centre of dairying.  
Otago agents responded to these changes by an expansion in size, incorporation, extension of 
their operations northwards, and the centralisation of decision-making, mostly in Wellington. 
Wright Stephenson incorporated in 1906 and expanded northwards, establishing a Wellington 
Head Office by 1919 which was viewed as, ‘a more convenient place to centre our accounts than 
Dunedin’.xxxvi At the time its decentralised structure, with each branch being operated with 
considerable autonomy, was replaced by centralisation from Wellington.xxxvii Murray Roberts 
also shifted its Head Office to Wellington in 1910.  NMA and Donald Reid, however, remained  
largely regional firms. 
 In Otago, as elsewhere, the distancing of the major pastoral agents from local 
communities contributed to the growth of farmer cooperatives as the alternative point of a 
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polycentric network. Although the region was not a major dairying area and thus cooperative 
factories were less common, the Otago Farmers’ Cooperative (OFC) was established in Dunedin 
in 1895. It took the appearance of the agency firms a decade or two previously in being small 
and localised where social and kinship elements were carefully fostered: rural branches were 
considered the ‘eyes and ears’ of the firm and branch managers were preferably married, ‘for 
social reasons, and because of the great assistance possible’.xxxviii Its relationships with some 
network members differed from agents like NMA, however.  In particular, its relationship with 
its farmers was an equity based one as it was owned by farmer shareholders and therefore 
responsibility for it fell upon the local rural community and the bonds of trust were especially 
strong.  The improvement in monitoring which this also implied can be seen by the example of 
the firm instructing their solicitor to search a particular will since they had ‘heard’ that an 
indebted client may have been a beneficiary.xxxix 
While its local social integration very strong, OFC’s ability to provide competent 
leadership was somewhat restrained.  It was formed with a view to reducing agent commission 
rates for the sale and consignment of produce.  OFC affiliated with the Farmers’ Cooperative 
Wholesale Federation, a national organisation, by contributing the equivalent of two per cent of 
its own paid up capital, to obtain supplies at discounted prices. Within a few years it was 
financing farmers in relation to short term produce credit and, in some cases, the provision of 
stock mortgages.  Thus, its network had extended from trade to some trade-finance features.  Its 
smallness, however, meant that some transactions, including most property sales, occurred 
directly between agent and farmer. Its limited capital base meant that finance was sometimes 
arranged directly with mortgagees although sometimes mediated by OFC. Moreover, in an 
increasingly competitive industry with agents drawing upon national and international sources of 
finance, information, and entrepreneurship, strong emphasis on the local network put OFC at a 
disadvantage. Poor quality entrepreneurship helps explain their problems throughout the 1920s 
and the heavy write down of their shares in the following decade. Thus, whilst its social 
integration was a powerful force generating trust, governance, and reputational benefits, its 
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ability to provide competent leadership was restrained by its limited service diversification and 
geographic reach. The limited size of the network in which it operated also meant smaller 
savings in communication costs. 
 
VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In a recent study of business networks Casson has shown how a network based upon trade can 
evolve into a more widely-embracing trade and financial network as technology-driven 
expansions in scale cause individually financed small production units to be supplanted by joint 
financing of a single large unit; the independent financiers are thus brought together.xl There 
were few scale economies emerging in New Zealand pastoralism where most production units 
remained small.  However, we are able to provide an historically based variation on Casson’s 
hypothesised network by showing that trade and finance can exist together as part of a network 
from the outset. Indeed, the trade-finance nexus provided critical synergies in the formation and 
development of New Zealand pastoral networks which agent firms recognised from very early 
on: regular trading transactions between agent and farmer generated trust, reputational effects, 
and mutual information exchange vital for successful lending, while finance bound the two 
parties into long term relations which would generate trade commissions.  This explains why 
lending at zero profit or below was not uncommon.  In our intermediated network, moreover, 
agents soon realised the benefits of cooperation with each other in trading procedures and, 
perhaps to a lesser degree, loan policies.  As the trade-finance network expanded in size and 
complexity a well-placed and competent leader could mitigate rising communication costs and 
engineer higher levels of trust.  We have seen how agents and cooperatives took on this role, 
sometimes in competition with each other, and with differing degrees of success.  The trade-
finance network was indeed a powerful organisational form fostering the rapid expansion of 
New Zealand farm production and export. 
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FIGURE 2 
COOPERATIVE- & AGENT-LED POLYCENTRIC PASTORAL NETWORK 
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FIGURE 3 
OTAGO AGENT-LED MONOCENTRIC PASTORAL NETWORK BY THE 1880s 
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